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a beginning, yet they laid the foundation for the future 
growth of research universities in China. These years would 
be one of the first of many instances of Chinese educational 
leaders borrowing from abroad in higher education in the 
20th century.
Looking Forward
Today’s Chinese higher education reformers still pay close 
attention to higher education in other countries, yet reform-
ers have never been able to completely cast off ancient tradi-
tions or ignore the vicissitudes of state politics. In the early 
21st century, the biggest challenge for us is to establish a 
Chinese model of higher education and gain comparative 
advantage. 
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The fourth faculty strike in two years, over salaries in Ke-nya’s public universities, ended in March. If history is a 
guide, the truce is merely a strategic retreat before another 
battle. Soon drumbeats of war will be sounded for another 
night of long knives. The frequent high-octane skirmishes 
over university salaries have become toxic to the nation and 
disruptive to academic programs. So, what ails public uni-
versity salaries in Kenya and how can the problems be ame-
liorated once and for all?
The discontent over university salaries stems from 
a triumvirate of three interrelated factors: union-initiated 
cost-of-living salary adjustments, merit pay, and equity. The 
failure by national educational authorities and the univer-
sity administrators to resolve the contradictions arising 
from these issues only serves to amplify the stakes in sal-
ary adjustments and ensures that unions and universities 
are locked eternal combat. Key to resolving the incessant 
battle is moderating the enormous influence of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in compensation enhancement in 
public universities.
Collective Bargaining Agreements 
No doubt, trade unions play a crucial role in setting the low-
er and upper limits of university salaries. The unions have 
a good grasp of the macro- and micro-economic conditions, 
affecting the purchasing power of their member’s income. 
The 33 percent salary and 17 percent housing-allowance in-
crease negotiated in 2014 between the state universities and 
three unions—the University Academic Staff Union (rep-
resenting the faculty), the Kenya University Staff Union 
(representing the professional staff), the Kenya Union of 
Domestic, Hotels Educational Institutions, Hospitals and 
Allied workers (representing the junior staff)—shows the 
dexterity of the unions in cushioning their members from 
the deleterious effects of inflation. Under the agreement, 
the most senior professors earn a consolidated monthly pay 
of around US$3,300, while their junior counterparts make 
US$1,757. With an average inflation rate of 12 percent and 
with no free public education for dependents, these sala-
ries are barely sufficient to sustain a middle-class lifestyle 
for the academic staff. Even with the increase, the salaries 
still lag behind their counterparts in the judiciary and leg-
islature. Twenty years ago a senior university professor, a 
judge, and a member of parliament earned similar month-
ly pay and benefits. Today, a member of parliament takes 
home around US$9,400, while a judge makes US$7,000 
per month.
These across-the-board salary increases, along with the 
accompanying annual increases based on years of service, 
have exerted severe pressure on the government exchequer 
and university treasuries. So much so that universities di-
verted portions of the funds meant for payment of the new 
salaries toward debt clearance and facilities maintenance, 
thereby occasioning the latest industrial strife.
Pay for Performance 
While the unions have proved to be adept at reading the 
macro-level economic conditions, they are very poor read-
ers of merit-pay systems in universities. Due to the stran-
glehold of Collective Bargaining Agreements, lecturers and 
professors in the same grade earn similar salaries, despite 
differing levels of productivity. In other words, “pay for per-
formance” is anathema in Kenya’s public university system. 
In a merit-based system, salary increases are also weighted 
on performance indicators in the areas of teaching, schol-
arship, and community service. The system appeals to the 
values of individualism, achievement, and rewards. In ab-
sence of a merit-based compensation system in Kenya to-
day, a highly productive professor or lecturer will mainly 
earn the same salary as their nonproductive counterparts—
longevity in rank being the only condition for annual salary 
increments.
To reward merit, university mandarins need to devise 
annual pay-for-performance salary increases weighted in 
accordance with teaching, scholarship, and community 
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engagement as per the institutional missions. Such a sys-
tem will also make it possible for both the administrators 
and university staff to identify organizational goals that are 
worthy of financial reward—thereby reinforcing institu-
tional values. In addition, merit pay moderates institutional 
budgetary constraints by limiting the amount of funds dedi-
cated toward across-the-board salary increases.
Market Pay Equity
Since Kenya’s universities source additional revenues from 
the marketplace, it is only realistic that salaries reflect the 
realities of the marketplace. Under Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, all professors and lecturers in the same rank 
command similar salaries irrespective of disciplinary af-
filiation. Professors and lecturers of medicine cost more 
to train, recruit, retain, and generate more research grants 
to the university than their counterparts in the humani-
ties and social sciences. So why should their base pay be 
comparable? By infusing market-based disciplinary differ-
entiation in the base pay for university academics, Kenyan 
universities will ensure that faculty retention is feasible in 
disciplines with high-market demand.
The same policy of differentiated pay, based on insti-
tutional context, should apply for university executives. 
During the recent industrial fracas, vice-chancellors were 
reported to have illegally awarded themselves a 100 per-
cent salary hike. Why should vice chancellors at nascent 
institutions—like Karatina, Kisii, and Chuka—with stu-
dent population barely crossing the 2,000 mark command 
the same pay as leaders in complex urban universities like 
Kenyatta and Nairobi with student populations of 60,000 
and 54,000 respectively? The dexterity and mental energies 
required to run the latter far outweighs the former. Policy 
guidance from the Commission on University Education 
and the state education office on vice-chancellor compensa-
tion will be invaluable in this regard.
In all, permanent ceasefire will not be possible without 
a democratization of budget making in the state universi-
ties. Union allegations of high-level corruption at the uni-
versities coupled with student strikes over fee increments 
show how opaque the university budgets have become. If 
universities can publicize mundane activities—like cultural 
shows, high profile visits, and gate openings—they can at 
least share budget information with their constituents as 
national and county governments do. They could do well 
to borrow from American institutions, where budgets are 
posted online and university presidents give annual state of 
the university address. Further, proposals for fee increase 
need to be exhaustively discussed with students before im-
plementation. 
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The Australian government’s recent national spending audit, commissioned by the incoming federal govern-
ment in advance of the mid-May Budget, opened a Pando-
ra’s box of proposals—not least in higher education. Now 
that the federal budget has been proclaimed, it is clear how 
well these ideas accord with the relevant minister’s own 
views. While not all ideas were taken up, at least three repay 
closer attention: public funding of higher education, priva-
tization, and regulation.
Minister Pyne’s recent speech in London professed 
shock that more Australian universities were not in the 
top 50 worldwide, as one reason supporting a shake up in 
higher education. This is the kind of statement we expect 
from ministers of education anywhere—the Malaysian 
minister, among many others, has made similar noises in 
recent years. But in Pyne’s case, the reference to the Times 
Higher Education World Reputation Rankings can only be 
explained as either the expression of a minister—either 
not familiar with the details of his portfolio or as a way of 
making a political point. The Times Higher Education rank-
ings, of course, give substantial weight to reputation, rather 
than actual performance. The much more robust, reliable 
Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Rankings of World Universi-
ties (ARWU) shows that, while Australia has no entry in the 
top 50 for 2013, five universities (Melbourne, Australian Na-
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